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  1“…political institutions are the most important determinants of 
financial institutions.” 
North and Shirley (2008, 288) 
 
“…there is a technological reason why some industries depend 
more on external finance than others.” 
Rajan and Zingales (1998, 563)  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Financial development, defined as the existence of deep and stable credit markets in an economy, 
is good for economic growth (Levine, 2005).
1  An economy without credit cannot move 
forward.
2 At the most basic level, credit is the mechanism through which savers connect to 
borrowers, enabling firms to carry out investment projects that are the basis for the process of 
capital accumulation. But credit does not only foster economic growth through investment. It 
also promotes productivity growth in a number of ways: by helping firms sustain long gestation 
periods when developing new technologies or processes (Aghion et al., 2005); by fostering a 
better allocation of resources across firms and economic sectors (Levine, 1997)
3 and by reducing 
the incidence of informality, understood as lack of firm or workers registration, or tax evasion 
and social security registration avoidance (Catão, Pagés and Rosales, 2009). Finally, access to 
finance allows firms to cope better with macroeconomic volatility (Cavallo et al., 2009).  
Why, then, do so many countries have low financial development? The literature has 
stressed two explanations. One has to do with structural conditions that either limit demand or 
hinder the ability of some countries to meet rising demand (limited supply). Deficiencies in 
demand are determined by the stages of country development: economies in the early stages of 
industrialization and economic development do not have the need for deep and highly 
sophisticated financial markets. Deficiencies in supply have been tied to underlying structural 
                                                 
1 Levine (2005) is one survey among many of the vast literature behind this stylized fact. For example, Haber (2008) is 
another relevant study that summarizes the economic history literature on the topic that finds similar evidence.  
2 Some of the more relevant studies include King and Levine (1993a, 1993b); Levine (1997, 1998); Levine and Zervos 
(1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000). 
Additionally, at the macro level, depth of access is negatively correlated with poverty rates (Levine, 1997; Honohan, 
2004). 
3 Several papers provide an analytical basis for this idea. See also Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1995) for a general 
discussion. Also, Buera and Shin (2008), Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2008), Jeong and Townsend (2007), Aghion et al. 
(2005), and Greenwald, Kohn and Stiglitz (1990), are examples of models describing how financial restrictions lead to 
an inefficient allocation of resources either across sectors or across activities with differential productivities. See Arizala, 
Cavallo and Galindo (2009) for empirical evidence on the link between credit and industry-level TFP growth. 
  2conditions of a society that create impediments for creating viable financial sectors. A 
particularly influential strand of the literature in this current has focused on the role of the legal 
system.
4 It may be the case that  a country’s legal framework, which has been usually inherited 
by most countries from colonial times, significantly determines the extent to which the 
contemporary legal system protects minority shareholder and creditor rights, thereby 
conditioning the development of financial markets (La Porta et al., 1997).  
Although compelling, some of the implications that arise from this set of explanations do 
not square well with the evidence, at least as unique explanations. For example, there seems to 
be quite a lot of heterogeneity in financial development across countries, even within the subset 
of countries with the same legal origin. At the same time, the history of financial development is 
one of advances and reversals, something that is hard to reconcile with the idea of structural 
determinants of financial development. Therefore, it is necessary to find theories that 
complement the structural views using more variable factors (Rajan and Zingales, 2003a). 
The other strand in the literature looks at how the workings of political institutions shape 
political actors’ incentives to provide financial development. The literature has focused on two 
interconnected explanations. On the one hand, it has concentrated on the role of interest groups 
as obstacles for financial development. In this current, incumbent interest groups that may see 
their profits eroded would oppose the policies that would foster financial deepening. In the most 
cited work (Rajan and Zingales, 2003a) financial development might foster competition by 
allowing entry to credit-constrained firms, which weakens the position of incumbents, both in 
industry and in finance. In the industrial sector, for example, incumbent firms can provide 
themselves their own financing and thus prefer to limit credit in order to prevent others from 
entering, thereby limiting competition.
5 Rajan and Zingales (2003a) argue that this creates a 
compact political constituency against financial development.
6 The incentives and strength of 
                                                 
4 Stulz and Williamson (2003) shows that another structural determinant, a country’s religions, is highly significant for 
explaining creditors’ right. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) show the relevance of social capital, and henceforth 
trust, for explaining household’s financial choices and ultimately financial development. According to Durante (2009), 
trust is also structurally determined by geography and historical climate patterns.  
5 In their analysis, they assume that incumbents are a homogenous group both in industry and the financial sector, and 
both prefer limiting financial development. Regarding the incentives for the latter group, the authors argue that financial 
institutions may prefer limiting financial development because they may lose certain “assets” such as “human capital” 
from the development of financial markets. 
6 There is a closely related literature based on the patterns of institutionalization and democratic transitions that 
concentrate on a particular type of incumbent: the politically powerful elite (Hodler, 2007). 
  3interest groups to fend off financial development will be lower the more open the economy is to 
both trade and finance.
7  
One the other hand, as summarized in Haber, North and Weingast (2008), the 
government may also have the incentive to limit financial development in order to draw 
resources from banks and credit markets, regardless of the structure of interest groups in society. 
Consequently, even though favoring financial development may be welfare-enhancing, 
government officials in some countries may prefer maintaining a lax financial institutional 
environment, which does not promote credit, in case they need to draw funds from the system.
8 
Governments would be less inclined to “play the system” (be more willing to improve financial 
regulations and lower restrictions for financial development) to the extent that fiscal and 
financial management capacities are greater.
9  
In this paper we build on these contributions and provide a unified political economy 
story of financial development that hinges on the interaction between heterogenous interest 
groups and government policymaking capabilities.
10 That is, first, we expand the research in 
Rajan and Zingales (2003a) by allowing incumbents to be heterogeneous in terms of their 
position regarding financial development to check if that may generate different attitudes 
towards greater credit availability.
11 This heterogeneity of incumbents comes from the fact that 
within an economy there are sectors that are intrinsically more dependent on credit (as developed 
originally in a previous article by Rajan and Zingales of 1998). Consequently, under some 
conditions, this heterogeneity in terms of how much each firm (in each sector) depends on the 
availability of credit generates heterogeneity in terms of their positions regarding financial 
development. For those incumbents who are very dependent on credit, even though financial 
                                                 
7 See also Baltagi, Demetriades and Siong Hook (2009) for empirical evidence supportive of this hypothesis.  
8 Fry (1995) describes some of the mechanisms used by the government to finance its operations through the 
financial system, such as increasing reserve requirements, requiring institutions to hold government bonds at yields 
below the world market rate, and exploiting state-run banking institutions.  
9 Besley and Persson (2009) make a similar argument. Less developed economic institutions (lower tax revenues and 
lower financial development) are expected in those countries that have not been able to invest in increasing state 
capacities. Similarly, Bai and Wei (2000) and Dreher and Siemers (2005) argue that lower government capabilities, 
measured in terms of higher corruption, would also imply lower financial development because of the lower ability of 
the government to raise revenues.  
10 Pagano and Volpin (2001) is a relevant survey of the political economy literature focusing on this topic at the turn of 
the century that helps to put into perspective the advances made since then. 
11 A recent paper by Braun and Raddatz (2008) also introduces heterogeneous incumbents—dividing them between 
promoters and opponents of financial development- and find this heterogeneity to be significant to explain financial 
development. As will be explained below, the main differences here with that paper are two: i) we do not have to decide 
ex ante about how to split the groups, and ii) we combine the role of the heterogeneity with that of government 
capabilities. 
  4development may erode their profits by fostering competition, it may also boost their profits by 
providing them with cheaper resources to operate and expand their operations. If these sectors 
are big enough actors in the economy, then the response against financial development by the 
incumbents described by Rajan and Zingales (2003a) may be weaker or even altogether 
nonexistent. For the whole economy, the overall level of opposition to financial development 
that governments may face would depend on the combination of how dependent on credit the 
economic sectors in that economy are and the size of these economic sectors. In other words, 
opposition to financial development in a given country hinges on the relative size of the 
economic sectors that rely most heavily on financial credit.  
Second, we combine incumbents’ interests and their potential effect on policymaking 
with the ability of the government to avoid distorting financial markets financial development. 
Building on insights in Haber, North and Weingast (2008), we argue that in countries where 
governments have lower state capacities, public officials are more pressed to direct credit to 
finance their own operations, thereby curtailing credit flows to the private sector.
12 All in all, this 
implies that the availability of credit for the private sector—a key feature of financial 
development—will tend to be lower in lower-capabilities environments.
13  
Therefore, our argument is that financial development should be higher in those countries 
in which interest groups might have a lower incentive to block its development and where the 
government has less need to abuse the financial system in order to finance its operations. 
Summarizing, our hypothesis is that the actual level of financial development observed in a 
given country at a point in time is the result of the interaction of these two factors.
14  
In order to test this hypothesis we use sector-level panel data to build a cross-country 
dataset with proxies for the sizes of the interest groups that may have different attitudes towards 
                                                 
12 Recent Argentine history on pension reforms provides a good example of government actions that may hinder the 
development of credit markets. One of the reasons why Argentina reformed its pension system in 1993 from a public 
pay-as-you-go system to one based on individual accounts, market capitalization and private management was to foster 
credit in the economy (e.g., by letting funds’ managers invest the savings in the local stock market). However, successive 
administrations affected the original intent by forcing funds to hold a higher and higher share of public debt, which was 
affected by the default, and by finally scrapping the system and returning to a public PAYG system (see El Cronista 
2009 for a chronology of events). In Chile, a country with higher government capabilities (Scartascini, Stein, and 
Tommasi, 2008) the outcomes of the reform process have been quite different (Rofman, Fajnzylber and Herrera, 2008).  
13 This result is consistent with Keefer’s findings that “…financial sector development depends on the willingness of 
governments to provide public goods” (Keefer 2008, 151). Moreover, our argument about government capabilities is 
consistent with his about check and balances, as higher government capabilities do only evolve in countries in which 
politicians show restrain. 
14 This is a novel hypothesis, as every other paper we are aware of treats these two lines of influence individually. 
  5financial development. We regress measures of financial development against these proxies, and 
also against measures of country-level institutional capabilities, and their interaction.   
To preview our results, we find that lower opposition to financial development will result 
in an effective increase in credit markets’ development only in those countries which have high 
government capabilities and improvements in government capabilities would only have an 
impact in those countries in which credit dependency is high.
15 In economic terms, we find that 
an increase in a country’s average credit dependency roughly equal to the difference in this 
measure between Ecuador and Belgium would imply an average increase in financial 
development between 0 percent and 25 percent of GDP, depending on the level of government 
capabilities.
16 Similarly, we find that an increase in government capabilities roughly equal to the 
difference between Chile and Japan would imply an average increase in financial development 
between 0 percent and 29 percent of GDP, depending on the level of credit dependency of the 
country.
17 In other words, we find that interest groups politics and government policymaking 
capabilities are both necessary conditions for financial development. This way, we explain 
differences in financial development across countries and also provide evidence about one of the 
mechanisms through which government capabilities matter for economic growth.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section introduces a stylized model that 
incorporates some of the nuances involved in the process of financial development with 
heterogeneous agents. Next, we discuss the methodology, the data and the results. The last 
section presents the conclusions. 
  
                                                 
15 Our econometric results are robust to different specifications, even controlling by potential endogeneity of explanatory 
variables and alternative definitions of government capabilities and financial development variables. The examples that 
follow have been constructed according to the results reported in Table 1. 
16 For example, for countries with bureaucratic quality around the median, such as Zimbabwe, Portugal, Greece or Costa 
Rica, the estimated average effect oscillates between 8 percent and 10 percent of GDP, while for countries with higher 
bureaucratic quality levels such as the Netherlands and Canada, the estimated average effect is around 22 percent of 
GDP. On the other side of the distribution, for countries with low government capabilities levels such as El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Zambia, an increase of the credit dependency index would not generate a significant change in financial 
development levels. 
17 For countries like the Philippines and Costa Rica, the estimated average effect oscillates around 8.3 percent of GDP, 
while for countries with higher credit dependence levels, such as the United States, Ireland or Israel, the estimated 
average effect is around 20 percent of GDP. For countries with low credit dependency levels, such as Jamaica, Algeria or 
Ethiopia, an increase in government capabilities would not represent a significant change in financial development 
levels. 
  6 
2.  Conceptual Framework  
 
As argued in the introduction, the literature has recently converged towards studying financial 
development in a political economy framework.
18 Among the many studies in this field, Rajan 
and Zingales (2003a) has become the basic building block for most papers that include the role 
of interest groups as a potential determinant of financial development. In their underlying model, 
the incumbents are willing to thwart financial development for maintaining the rents they would 
lose by the increase in competition that improved credit markets might generate.
19 In their setup, 
incumbents are homogenous. However, as Rajan and Zingales (1998) posit, firms across sectors 
might differ in certain respects, particularly in their degree of credit dependency. That is, because 
technology across sectors is different, the relevance of capital in the production function and 
henceforth the need to have access to external sources of finance might be different. For 
example, as presented in Appendix Table A4, developing plastic products is much more capital 
intensive than the tobacco industry. Then, it might be the case that producers of plastic products 
feel very differently about the possibility of having higher access to capital markets than 
producers of tobacco products. Hence, while in some sectors financial development could be 
detrimental for profits, as Rajan and Zingales (2003a) assume, in others sectors the reduction in 
the cost of capital after financial development may be large enough to compensate for the 
potential increase in competition. If that were the case, opposition to financial development may 
also be heterogeneous, with some groups losing more from an influx of credit than others.
20 At 
the limit, some sectors may even be in favor of increasing credit, as shown in a simple model 
next.
21  
Consider a simple set-up consisting of one country with N productive sectors that differ 
only in terms of the dependence of each sector on external credit to finance investment and 
                                                 
18 The edited volume by Haber, North and Weingast (2008) is a good example of the depth of this literature. 
19 Their analysis could be interpreted in terms of a highly stylized Stigler-Peltzman type of model in which incumbents 
would be able to keep some of the rents associated with incomplete financial development by compensating politicians 
or regulators for their political costs—financial development is welfare-enhancing, so citizens should be in favor of it—
by providing rents, bribes, or campaign contributions. 
20 Additionally, financial development has a differential impact on volatility across sectors according to their credit 
dependency (Raddatz, 2006), and credit dependent sectors may be hit harder in recessions in financially constrained 
countries (Braun and Larraín, 2005). Therefore, there may be additional channels of influence we are not considering 
that would reinforce our results. 
21 This paper concentrates on showing the impact of heterogeneity taking the political economy model as given. 
Basically, the underlying model behind Rajan and Zingales and this paper is a typical Grossman-Helpman (or Stigler-
Peltzman) model in which the government weighs interest group preferences against those of voters when deciding the 
level of financial development. 
  7operations. One way of modeling this is to assume that production technologies differ across 
sectors in terms of the capital intensity of the production functions. From the perspective of an 
individual firm, accessing credit markets allows it to purchase certain types of goods—mostly 
capital goods—that would be unavailable without proper funding. Therefore, the more capital 
intensive is the firm’s production technology, then the bigger is the need for external funding.    
The representative firm within each sector  N i ,..., 1 =   produces output using a standard 
Cobb-Douglas production function  
 
1 0 < < = i i i i
i k A q α
α  (1) 
 
where qi is physical output per unit of labor in sector i, Ai is the sector-level TFP, ki is the stock 
of capital per unit of labor, and αi is the sector-specific output elasticity of capital. For simplicity, 
in what follows we assume that .   1 ≡ i A
The sectors operate under monopolistic competition, meaning that incumbent firms in 
each sector earn positive profits.
22 Monopolistic competition arises and is sustained in this setting 
because there are barriers to entry related to credit frictions—i.e., the inability of entrepreneurs to 
secure the funding needed to begin operations in a sector due to insufficient financial 
development.  
The inverse demand function that incumbents face in each sector takes the form 
1   and   every  for          
1












p  (2) 
where ω is a positive scale factor and σ  is the negative of the price elasticity of demand. This 
class of demand function is the result of a maximization of a CES utility (or a CES aggregator) 
function and its use is standard in models of monopolistic competition based on differentiated 
products.
23 Note that the σ  parameter is directly related to the competitive nature of the sectors. 
As  1 → σ , quantities produced by an individual firm become more sensitive to price changes as 
in monopoly market structures. Instead, as  ∞ → σ  prices become insensitive to firm-specific 
production as in perfect competition. 
                                                 
22 This assumption follows the setting in Rajan and Zingales (20030a). In this exercise we are only relaxing their 
homogeneity assumption. 
23 See, for instance, Hsieh and Klenow (2009). 
  8For a given level of production, firms’ optimal demand of capital and the total cost 
function are  
i
i i q k
α 1 =  (3) 
1 0
1 < < = R Rq TC
i
i i
α  (4) 
where  R  represents the rental cost of capital. Incumbents maximize their profits, defined as 
i i TC p = i iq − π , when their marginal revenue is equal to their marginal cost, i.e., 
 














σ  (5) 
This yields the standard result that, under a monopolistic competition framework, 




σ ) over the 
marginal cost.
24 The mark-up is higher, the lower σ  is, or in other words, the less competitive is 
the corresponding sector.  
Replacing the inverse demand function  ( )
σ ω
1 / i i q p =  in (5), we obtain that the optimal 
level of production  of the incumbent is 
*
i q






















* 1  (6) 
and replacing (6) into the profit function  i i i i TC q p − = π , we get that the representative 
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R    (7) 
Using this simple set-up, we do a comparative static exercise: what is the impact of an 
exogenous increase in credit on equilibrium profits in each sector? An increase in the availability 
of credit has the effect of reducing the rental cost of capital R . Thus, in what follows we focus 
                                                 
24 Note that as  ∞ → σ , a simple application of L’Hôpital’s rule shows that we approach the perfect competition 
case whereby the mark-up disappears and the profit-maximizing condition reduces to the standard price equal to 
marginal cost.  



















σ π i i
R R
i i  (8) 
where the sign is unambiguous for all possible values of  R ,  i α  andσ . This implies that an 
exogenous increase in credit that lowersR , has an unambiguously positive effect on incumbents’ 
profit. Furthermore, for production levels greater than one, it is also possible to show that this 
effect is greater in the sector that is more capital intensive (i.e., the sector with higher i α ).
25 
Thus far, we have shown that incumbents’ profits increase with financial development 
and that the effect is greater for firms in the sector that relies more heavily on credit. The next 
logical question, then, is who is against developing credit markets? The answer to this question 
brings us back to the Rajan and Zingales (2003a) hypothesis: increased credit increases the scope 
for competition within sectors as it enables potential entrants to gain the means to enter (i.e., 
financial development lowers the barriers to entry into sectors). As entry happens, incumbents’ 
profits are eroded. Can this effect be big enough to overturn the previously computed effect? The 
short answer is that the secondary effect is bigger in sectors that are less dependent on credit. 
Therefore, for the low α sectors, the two effects compound: on the one hand profits do not 
increase as much with an increase in credit through the channel of reducing the rental cost of 
capital, and on the other hand, incumbents simultaneously suffer more from increased 
competition by new entrants. Therefore, the less credit dependent a given sector is, the more 
likely it is that the incumbents in that sector will oppose financial development.  
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π α  where   is defined as in equation (6). This derivative is negative 
for all  . 
i q
1 > i q
  10This relationship suggests that at higher levels of R  (low financial development) σ  is low, 
meaning less competition within sectors, and vice versa. While the functional form is ad hoc, this 
simple specification has the advantage of capturing the essence of the argument: barriers to entry 
into sectors decrease as financial markets develop with the consequent decrease in the cost of 
capital.
26  
So far we have assumed that governments and institutions do not matter much for firms’ 
finances. In order to introduce government capabilities as a factor that determines firms’ stance 
regarding credit development, we use an approach similar to Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and 
model the impact of low government capabilities on market interest rates as a distortion to the 
market price of capital. In particular, we assume that governments in lower-capabilities 
environments are (i) more eager for finance and (ii) less capable of accessing credit on a 
competitive basis. The combination of (i) and (ii) results in higher interest rates for private 
productive investments as government financial decisions have the effect of curtailing credit 
flows to the private sector.
27 This way, while we consider that governments decide about the 
policies that determine the development of credit markets, such as the regulatory framework, 
according to the strength of the different interest groups in society, we take the level of 
government capabilities and their financing needs as exogenous. This is the same than assuming 
that governments have no leeway for deciding the amount of public goods they have to provide 
and the way they can finance them; those decisions are predetermined by “their type,” i.e., their 
level of government capabilities. 
Consequently, in the model, government capabilities enter as an exogenous parameter, 
and we assume that  
λ
r
R =  (10) 
where r is the interest rate that would prevail in the private credit market in the absence of any 
government-induced distortions, and  r > λ  is a parameter that proxies for government 
                                                 
26 The particular functional form was chosen so that we can get reasonable parameter values for subsequent numerical 
exercises.  
27 In this paper we take government capabilities and their financing needs as exogenous. That is, governments will decide 
how much financial development in terms of the demands from the pressure groups but they will not make a decision on 
public goods provision and financing needs. 
  11capabilities.
28 Note that with  1 = λ  the government is neutral (high government capabilities), and 
with  1 < λ  then r R > (low government capabilities).While once again the particular functional 
form may be arbitrary, it has the advantage of introducing the role of government capabilities in 
credit markets in a very concise way.  
Under this framework, it is possible to probe deeper into the consequences of financial 
development for incumbents’ profits. The partial derivative of the profit function (7) with respect 





































λ α λ σ
π π π α ln
2 1
2 2 = i q
r
σ / 1    (11) 
where   is defined in equation (6). Given   and  i q 0
2 2 > − r λ i q > ω , the second term inside the 
parenthesis in equation (11) is always greater than zero. Equation (11) implies that an increase in 
the interest rate (i.e., low financial development) can be understood as the sum of two effects: the 
first is the effect associated with a reduction in incumbent’s profits due to an increase in the cost 
of capital, while the second is an increase of the profits related with the reduction in competition.  
In order to see how the net effect depends on two key parameters of the model, i.e., λ that 
captures government policymaking capabilities and α that captures the heterogeneity within the 
interest groups in terms of their need for credit, we approximate the relative change in a firm’s 













   (11a) 
which depends on the particular level of the interest rate r, government capabilities λ , and 
firms’ capital intensity  i α . Figure 1 shows the numerical simulations of equation (11a) fixing for 
concreteness   and  . Take, for example, the case in which  1 . 0 = r 01 . 0 − = Δr 50 . 0 = λ , a low 
value of government capabilities. The simulation shows that a reduction in the cost of capital 
(i.e., ) implies a net reduction in profits for all the firms with capital intensity  01 . 0 − = Δr i α  is 
below a cutoff value of approximately equal to 0.7. This result suggests that firms in sectors with 
low α will oppose an increase in credit on the basis that it reduces incumbents’ profits. However, 
                                                 
28 Note that λ > r is not itself an assumption of the model, but the result of the assumption that σ > 1 (see equation 2) and 
the functional forms assumed in the model. The assumption σ > 1 imposes that R ≤ 1 (see equation 9), which is satisfied 
here if and only if  λ > r.  
  12the opposition will tend to decline as the need for external finance increases. And as the value of 
α   passes a certain threshold (i.e., approximately α=0.75 in this example) the net effect of 
financial development on incumbents’ profits turns positive. At higher initial values of λ , the 
net impact is positive for a broader range of α, but it remains true that the effect is quantitatively 
larger for sectors with high α. 
 
Figure 1. 

























































To summarize, financial development has different impacts on incumbents’ profits 
through two opposing channels, and the net result hinges on respective sectors’ dependency on 
capital. On the one hand, it has an unambiguously positive effect on profits through the channel 
of reducing the cost of capital. This effect is greater for firms that operate in sectors that are more 
dependent on credit. On the other hand, financial development lowers the barriers to entry into 
sectors, thereby fostering competition and eroding incumbents’ profits. This effect in turn is 
greater for firms in the sectors that are less dependent on credit.
29  The combination of the two 
results suggests that the extent to which incumbents are against financial development critically 
                                                 
29 Braun and Raddatz (2008) show this empirically. In their example, the negative impact of additional credit is higher 
for textiles (a sector with low credit dependency) than for non-basic chemicals (a sector with higher credit dependency. 
  13hinges on the sectors’ dependence on credit: firms in the low-dependence sector are more likely 
to oppose financial development, while firms in the high-dependence one are more likely to 
demand it.
30  
Compounding all this is the role of government capabilities. The lower the levels of 
capabilities, the higher is the capital intensity threshold above which the marginal effect of 
financial development on incumbents’ profit is positive (i.e., the cutoff between opposing or 
favoring financial development). The intuition is that lower government capabilities generate a 
“crowding out” effect that raises the cost of private capital. Therefore, the benefits of financial 
development accrue to a smaller subset of firms—only those that operate in the most capital- 
intensive sectors—than in the case where the same improvement in financial development occurs 
in a context of better government capabilities. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the extent to which incumbents will block 
financial development hinges on the combination of their respective sectors’ dependence on 
credit and government capabilities.  A direct implication is that financial development at the 
country level will be positively related to the relative size of the sectors that are highly dependent 
on credit and to the degree of institutional quality: countries where the relative size of the highly 
dependent sectors is large, will tend to have—all else equal—more financial development, but 
this effect may be neutralized if government capabilities are low.
31 This is the implication of the 
model that we take to the data. 
 
3.  Model Specification and Data 
 
3.1 Model Specification 
Armed with the intuition given by the analytical framework, the question we take to the data is 
the following: does the combination of heterogeneity among incumbents in their opposition to 
financial development together with the heterogeneity in government capabilities help to explain 
part of the variance in financial development observed across countries? 
                                                 
30 These results could be presented in the same stylized Stigler-Peltzman model mentioned above. Government 
capabilities affect firms’ stance regarding financial development through their impact on financial conditions, which 
varies by sector. Consequently, opposition to financial development (the welfare enhancing policy) by incumbent interest 
groups differs according to the level of credit dependency of the economy, which is determined by the economic 
structure of the country, together with government capabilities. 
31 This hypothesis is compatible with related findings in Perotti and Volpin (2004: 4) on entry regulations: “there appears 
to be more entry in industries that require more external capital in countries which are more democratic.”  
  14To answer this question, we collect data on several variables that describe in detail the 
level of financial development, interest groups heterogeneity and their attitudes towards financial 
development, and government policymaking capabilities for a number of countries. In our 
baseline scenario, we use a simple cross-section analysis, which is well-suited to capture long-
run, steady-state relationships between the variables of interest. 
The econometric specification for our baseline model is  
( ) j j j j j j j GC CD GC CD FD ε β β β β + + × + + + = γX 3 2 1 0  (12) 
where   is a proxy variable of financial development level for country  ,   is a variable 
that measures incumbents’ credit dependence, and   is a proxy of the government 
policymaking capabilities, whereas 
j FD j j CD
j GC
j j GC CD ×  is the interaction of these two. Finally,   
represents a set of control variables which affect the level of financial development of a country, 
such as level of industrialization (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), openness to trade and financial 
markets (Chinn and Ito, 2006; Baltagi, Demetriades and Siong Hook, 2009; and Rajan and 
Zingales 2003a) and legal origin (La Porta et al., 1997). 
j X
The null hypothesis of interest is that, after conditioning by other determinants, an 
increment in credit dependence in a country (i.e., a reduction in the opposition to financial 
development) only has a significant effect on financial development in countries with high levels 
of government policymaking capabilities. In the same vein, an increase in government 
capabilities is significant only in conjunction with low opposition to financial development. This 
means that the marginal effects of credit dependence and government capabilities on financial 



















must be significant only for higher values of   and   respectively. A direct implication 
derived from equations (13) and (14) is that, under the null hypothesis, the interaction effect (
j CD j GC
3 β ) 
must be positive. However, the sign and statistical significance of the marginal effects depend on 
  15particular combinations between the level coefficients ( 1 β  an 2 d β ) and the values  j GC of  3 β  
j CD and  3 β  respectively.
32  
Our empirical strategy is implemented in two steps. First, we estimate equation (12) 
using information about financial development, credit dependence and government capabilities. 
Second, we evaluate the sign and statistical significance of the marginal effects in equations (13) 
and (14). If estimated marginal effects are positive and significant only for high values of   
and , then we interpret this as supportive evidence for our null hypothesis. 
j CD
j GC
                                        
 
3.2 The Data 
 
In order to follow our empirical strategy, the first challenge is to define the three main variables 
of interest: i) a country-level financial development indicator, ii) a variable capturing interest 
groups’ heterogeneity and their attitudes towards credit and iii) a government policymaking 
capabilities indicator. With respect to i) we follow the convention in the literature of using the 
ratio of private credit to GDP as the benchmark measure of a country’s financial development. 
As explained by Levine et al. (2000) this ratio isolates the credit issued to the private sector, as 
opposed to credit issued to governments, government agencies, and public enterprises. 
Furthermore, it excludes credit issued by the central bank. This is our preferred measure of 
financial development because it is the most direct measure of financial intermediation to the 
private sector.
33 Thus, we interpret higher levels of this variable as indicating higher levels of 
financial services for the private sector, and therefore greater credit availability and access. The 
data source is the World Development Indicators dataset (WDI), which contains annual 
information for a large panel of countries. We also run robustness checks using other proxies for 
financial development such as the stock market capitalization of listed companies as a percentage 
         
32 In order to compute the statistical significance of equations (13) and (14), it is important to note take into account 
that the standard errors associated with the coefficient estimates are individually not enough to determine whether 
the marginal effect is statistically significant. For example, note that for equation (13): 
) , ) var( ) ( ) var( 3 1 3
2















cov( ) j ( 2 +  
33 We did not use a measure of financial regulations (a policy variable in control of the authorities) instead of an outcome 
measure because the evidence indicates that de jure regulations are quite different from de facto regulations, particularly 
for those countries with low levels of financial dependency (see Fanelli, 2010). 
  16of GDP, and the liquid liabilities of financial intermediaries as percentage of GDP, taken from 
the Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) dataset.  
To proxy the extent of incumbents’ support or opposition to financial development, we 
combine industrial statistics about technological requirements of credit by industrial sector with 
the relative size of each industry within a given country. In particular, we merge information 
from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) database of production-
related industrial statistics for 28 industrial sectors (3-digit ISIC code) in a panel of 166 countries 
for the years 1963 to 2003, with information from Rajan and Zingales (1998) on industrial 
sectors’ dependence on credit, which is expressed as a percentage of capital expenditures. This 
latter measure is computed using two key assumptions: i) there is a technological reason why 
some industries depend more on external finance than others and ii) these technological 
differences persist across countries and over time.
34 This measure captures credit dependence 
related to the use, in equilibrium, of external funds (as opposed to firm savings) in asset 
acquisition.
35  
From the UNIDO dataset we compute, for every country in the sample, the share of 
sector  i in the corresponding country’s total value added (i.e.,  j i, φ , where  ; and 
j=country). This share varies from 0.000001 to 0.942 in our sample and proxies the “size” of 
industrial sectors within each country j. Next, we multiply each 
28 , , 1 K = i
j i, φ  by the corresponding Rajan 
and Zingales measure of dependence on credit of each sector i ( ). The transformed variables 
compound sector size with the sector’s need for credit. Finally, in order to obtain a country-level 
proxy for incumbents’ resistance towards financial development, we aggregate the transformed 









i j i j RZ CD φ
 (15)
 
In words, our proxy for interest groups’ incentive to block financial development is the 
country-level average of Rajan and Zingales’s measure of dependence on credit, where the 
                                                 
34 This strategy of computing an industry’s dependence on external funds for any country with the coefficients identified 
for the United States by Rajan and Zingales is accepted in the literature. See, for example, Hsieh and Parker (2006). 
35 In the Appendix, we present a table with the list of 28 manufacturing sectors and their corresponding level of external 
dependence ranked from the lowest to the highest. 
  17weights are given by the size of each sector in the country’s industrial value added.
36 A high 
value of the  variable implies that, on average, incumbents in country j have low incentives 
to block financial development, and vice versa.  
j CD
With respect to the institutional variables, we proxy government policymaking 
capabilities using those variables usually found in the literature for which there is enough 
coverage in terms of both countries and years. One proxy is the quality of the bureaucracy. This 
variable works well with the framework in this paper because: i) bureaucratic quality is expected 
to affect a government’s ability to raise revenues and manage its fiscal and financial stance; 
hence, to affect its incentives to develop financial markets; and ii) high bureaucratic quality is 
not achieved overnight. It embodies a series of investments made by the polity over time; hence, 
it summarizes the ability and willingness of political actors to invest in a third party that could 
limit their discretion and at the same time help to enforce long-term commitments. This way, 
bureaucratic quality should capture long term determinants such as political stability and 
inclusiveness of political institutions (Besley and Persson, 2009).
37 It also captures characteristics 
of the polity such as political restraint.  
The source of the data on bureaucratic quality is the ICRG dataset, which covers the 
period 1960-2005 on an annual basis.
38 The bureaucratic quality index takes values from 0 to 6, 
where 6 represents that the country has a strong and expert bureaucracy. We also use other 
variables from the same dataset, such as an index of corruption and an index of government 
stability, and the ICRG Index of the quality of institutions (POL2), which is the sum of the 
corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality indexes.
39 
The set of control variables (which are the ones commonly used as determinants of a 
country’s level of financial development) include i) the log of real GDP per capita in PPP, as 
proxy of the level of industrialization, taken from the Penn World Tables (version 6.3);
40 ii) trade 
openness, computed as the sum of total exports and imports as percentage of GDP, taken from 
                                                 
j i,
36 In the robustness checks section we replace  φ  with alternative relative size measures that are based on labor and 
wage shares.   
37 If data availability were not a restriction, bureaucratic quality could be combined with two other similar traits of a 
polity that capture similar long-term investments such as judiciary independence and capabilities of the congress 
(Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi, 2009).  
38 This is the same source of institutional quality data used in Baltagi, Demetriades and Siong Hook (2009). 
39 These have been the variables of choice in previous studies such as Bai and Wei (2000), and Girma and Shortland 
(2004). 
40 http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/  
  18the World Development Indicators database; iii) financial openness, defined as the volume of 
foreign assets and liabilities as percentage of GDP, based on the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) 
dataset, and iv) legal origin dummies, taken from the Global Development Network Growth 
database.
41 
The conjunction of the degree of coverage of the three main variables and the control 
group variables determines the characteristics of the sample. Of these, the most restrictive in the 
time-series dimension is the credit dependence variable, which is available only up to the year 
2003. Altogether, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 97 countries (27 developed and 70 
developing) for which yearly data are available from 1965 to 2003. (See Appendix Table A3 for 
a list of countries.)  
A second important challenge is the definition of the time span to use in the analysis. As 
is mentioned at the beginning of this section, we are interested in establishing the long-run 
relationship between financial development levels and opposition to financial development by 
interest groups. Therefore, we choose to aggregate the data over a time period which describes 
accurately the dynamics of financial development. We use the average of financial development 
during the period 1980-2003, because 1980 is considered the starting point of the financial 
development recovery of the last part of twentieth century (Rajan and Zingales, 2003a). On the 
other hand, we attempt to minimize potential reverse causality problems by averaging the 
explanatory variables over a preceding, non-overlapping period: 1975-1979.
42 
 
4.  Regression Results 
 
The regression results for the pooled model (12) are presented in Table 1 (tables appear at the 
end of the paper). Our results are consistent with the traditional insights reported in the financial 
development literature. First, in all cases we find that the coefficient of GDP per capita is 
positive and statistically significant. Second, compared with countries with British legal origin 
(our base category), countries with French or Scandinavian legal origins show lower levels of 
                                                 
41 http://go.worldbank.org/ZSQKYFU6J0 
42 Given the unbalanced nature of the underlying panel dataset, the data coverage for many countries in our sample 
begins only in the 1980’s. Therefore, when we take averages over non-overlapping years we lose many countries in the 
sample and end up with a single cross-section of 74 countries. However, many of these countries re-enter the sample 
when we compute panel models (see Subsection 4.1.4) 
  19financial development.
43 Third, the openness effect, i.e., the effect of the combination of 
financial and trade openness, has a positive significant coefficient on financial development.
44 
Finally, the proxies for government capabilities and credit dependence are not statistically 
significant per se. However, in a model with interactive terms, the significance of the constituent 
terms of an interaction cannot be fully assessed independently from the interaction term.
45 
Moreover, the coefficient estimates of the interaction term are positive and statistically 
significant, which suggests that both variables have a reinforcing effect on the dependent 
variable.   
The novelties are the results on the sign of the estimated marginal effects of credit 
dependence and government capabilities (equations (13) and (14)). In order to facilitate the 
interpretation of these results, we focus on the graphic representation of these equations using the 
coefficient estimates from the baseline regression. For example, Figure 2 shows the estimated 
marginal effect of an increase of one standard deviation in the credit dependence variable, using 
the reported coefficient estimates in column (1.1). In this figure, the vertical axis shows the value 
of the right-hand-side of (13), and the horizontal axis shows the different values of   in our 
sample. The thick black line is the actual estimated marginal effect based on the regression 
results, while the bands around the central estimate are the 95 percent confidence intervals. In 




                                                 
43 However, opposite to the results in La Porta et al. (1997), German legal origin dummy yields a positive coefficient in 
all our regressions. This difference can be explained by differences in samples, as the La Porta et al. (1997) study 
includes seven German law countries, while ours includes only three (Austria, Japan and South Korea). 
44 See Baltagi, Demetriades and Siong Hook (2009). 
45 See Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005) for a thorough analysis linear regression models with interaction terms.  
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Figure 2 shows that a reduction in the opposition to credit development (i.e., an increase 
in  ) has a positive and statistically significant impact on the level of financial development 
only in countries with high government policymaking capabilities. In this particular estimation, 
the marginal effect is significant only for countries located around the median of the distribution 
of the bureaucratic quality index. 
j CD
Similarly, Figure 3 shows the analog marginal effect of government capabilities at 
different levels of credit dependence (equation (14)). The result shows that an increase in 
government capabilities has a positive and statistically significant impact on the level of financial 
development only in those countries with lower opposition to financial development.
46 
  
                                                 
46 As shown in Table 1, results are very similar for any of the proxies of government capabilities we use.  
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Taken together, these results are supportive of the main hypothesis of the paper: it is the 
combination of low opposition to financial development and high government capabilities that 
explains why some countries end up with higher levels of financial development. These results 
are consistent with previous results in the literature showing that interest groups and government 
capabilities are important for determining financial development. The novelty here is that we 
show that their influence is not independent from each other, but rather reinforcing. 
 
4.1. Robustness Checks 
 
In this section, we check the robustness of the results by using other measures of both financial 
development and incumbents’ opposition variables, addressing potential endogeneity problem, 
and using alternative estimation techniques.  
 
4.1.1.  Alternative Measures of Financial Development 
 
The first robustness check consists on examining the sensitivity of our baseline results to changes 
in the dependent variable. For this purpose, we include two commonly used proxies of financial 
development: (i) the stock market capitalization and (ii) the financial intermediaries’ liquid 
liabilities. Both are measured as a percentage of GDP, taken from the Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000) dataset. 
  22  23
Table 2 shows the estimation of the pooled model (12). For concreteness, we only report 
the regression results that use the bureaucratic quality (columns 2.1 and 2.3) and the institutional 
quality variables (columns 2.2 and 2.4) as proxies for government capabilities. The results are 
similar to those reported in Table 1: the coefficient estimates show the expected sign and 
significance. In particular, the estimated interaction effects are once again positive and 
significant.  
Estimated marginal effects are presented in Figures 4 and 5. These figures correspond to 
the effects estimated based on regression results reported in columns (2.1) to (2.3). In both cases 
the figures on the left-hand side panels show the results for the marginal effect of an increase in 
one standard deviation in the credit dependence variable (or alternatively, a reduction in the 
opposition to financial development), while the right-hand side panels show the results for the 
marginal effect of an increase in government capabilities. Figures 4 and 5 support the main 
conclusion of our baseline result: the marginal effects are positive and statistically significant 
only for relatively high levels of the conditioning variable (i.e., either government capabilities or 
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  244.1.2.  Alternative Measures of Opposition to Financial Development 
 
Our favorite measure of incumbents’ opposition to credit ( ) summarizes a country’s 
technological requirements of external funding. However, there are alternative variables that can 
serve as a measure for interest groups’ support or opposition to financial development.  
j CD
Rajan and Zingales (2003b) argue that if finance leads to competition, this fact must be 
reflected in competition measures, such as the incumbents’ profit margin. Based on this idea, 
Braun and Raddatz (2008) propose the use of the “strength of promoters” variable, which is 
defined as the difference between the profitability of promoters of and opponents to financial 
development. To compute this variable, Braun and Raddatz (2008) implement a three-stage 
procedure: first, they compute the profitability of each sector using the UNIDO dataset, defined 
as the difference between total sales and production costs (i.e., materials and labor costs) divided 
by total sales. This is the so-called “price-cost margin ratio” (PCM). Second, they classify the 
sectors as opponents and promoters of financial development based on the correlation between 
the sector-specific PCM and the ratio of private credit to GDP in pooled cross-country 
regressions. Finally, the “strength of promoters” by country is computed as the difference 
between the weighted (by their value added share) PCM of the two groups in every country. 
We estimate equation (12) replacing   with the “strength of promoters” as the proxy 
of incumbents’ opposition to financial development. As in the previous estimations, a high value 
on the strength of promoters means low opposition to financial development. Estimation results 
are reported in Table 3. Columns 3.1 and 3.2 show the results for private credit equations and 
columns 3.3 and 3.4 for the stock market capitalization equations.  
j CD
The results are similar to the baseline. In particular, the coefficient estimates of the 
interaction term between credit dependence and government capabilities are positive and 
statistically significant in all the cases. Moreover, Figure 6 shows the marginal effects based on 
column (3.1), which confirms our main result of the paper on the joint importance of both 
variables in explaining financial development. 
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4.1.3.  Endogeneity 
A potential problem that plagues this type of studies on financial development, including our 
own, is the question of the potential role of endogeneity. In particular, the size of the sectors that 
rely more on credit are possibly larger in countries with more developed financial markets, 
suggesting that the causality may run in the opposite direction. In a recent paper, Svaleryd and 
  26Vlachos (2005) argue that the pattern of industrial specialization depends on the availability of 
endowments for factors that are used relatively more intensively in the production process. Thus, 
countries with well functioning financial systems tend to specialize in industries highly 
dependent on external financing.  
Even though the results in Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) suggests that private credit over 
GDP (our preferred measure of financial development), is dominated by other indicators of 
financial development as a driver of specialization,
47 this result may prove relevant for our 
analysis because our credit dependence variable ( ) is computed as the sum of the relative 
size of an industrial sector (
j CD
j i, φ ) multiplied by its dependence on credit ( ). In the previous 
analyses we have dealt with this issue by using lagged values to construct the credit dependence 
proxies (i.e., we average the data on credit dependency for a period that preceded the data on 
financial development). Still, it is possible that this variable may be influenced by the initial 
endowment of credit in the economy. If that is the case, and if this endowment also influences 
the current level of credit, then the positive correlation that we find in the baseline scenario may 
simply reflect an accounting identity. 
i RZ
To deal with the potential effect of endogeneity we consider two alternative approaches. 
First, we test the sensitivity of our results to changes in the proxy for industrial sector size in the 
economy ( j i, φ ). In particular, we use two alternative industrial shares that do not depend on 
industrial value added, which may conceivably be endogenous. The first is based on the number 
of workers employed in each sector (i.e., the share of sector ݅ in the corresponding country’s total 
industrial employment), whereas the second is based on information about salaries (the share of 
sector ݅ in the corresponding country’s total industrial salaries). These measures reflect other 
determinants of economic structure, namely, the supply of labor and, if wages are considered as a 
proxy of workers’ skills, the supply of skilled labor. Both measures are computed based on 
UNIDO dataset and are available for the period 1965-2003. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of our baseline model (12) using the modified 
proxies of credit dependence. In particular, columns 4.1 – 4.4 show that the results are robust. 
Coefficient estimates have the same sign and statistical significance than the baseline. Moreover, 
                                                 
47 In particular, measures of “stock market development” and “accounting standards” seem to be the most important 
determinants of the pattern of industrial specialization. 
  27the estimated marginal effects of credit dependence and government capabilities are significant 
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48  This figure is based on estimated coefficients taken from column (4.1) of Table 4. 
  28Secondly, we implement an instrumental variables approach. Since credit dependence 
summarizes the revealed industrial economic patterns of a country, good instruments must be 
correlated to the pattern of industrial specialization, but may not be correlated with the error term 
in equation (12).  
We consider as possible instruments: the initial endowments (i.e., average 1963-1969) of 
the production factors: namely capital, labor, schooling, and arable land area. The rationale for 
the choice of instruments is the following: industrial specialization is governed by the relative 
availability of production factors (e.g., capital, labor, skilled labor, land and institutions).
49 
Moreover, the initial endowments of production factors are conceivably related to current 
financial development (the dependent variable) only through their influence on the patterns of 
industrial specialization (credit dependence). Therefore, the selected instruments conceivably 
satisfy the exclusion restrictions. While we cannot directly test the validity of the underlying 
identification assumptions, we can test whether the exclusion restrictions are violated through a 
suitable over-identification test.  
The instrumental variables results are reported in Table 4, columns (4.5) and (4.6). As 
explained, we instrument    and  j CD j j GC CD ×  with initial values of the production factors: 
capital, labor, schooling, and arable land area.
50 The results are very similar to the baseline—
although the estimation is a little bit more imprecise—and the marginal effects related with credit 
dependence and government policymaking capabilities variables remain unchanged. Figure 8 
shows the estimated marginal effects for equation (4.5). Once again, we find that the 
combination of low opposition to credit and high policymaking capabilities results in a positive 
effect on the level of financial development in an economy. Moreover, the model passes the 
Hansen over-identification test of the exclusion restrictions. 
  
                                                 
49 See Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) and Hidalgo et al. (2007). 
50 The source of the stock of capital and number of employees is the UNIDO dataset, while the variable average years of 
secondary schooling education is taken from Barro and Lee (2000). Finally, the source of the arable land area is the 
World Development Indicators dataset. 
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4.1.4.  Dynamic Panel Estimation  
 
As a final test, we extend our analysis to a dynamic panel framework. Panel estimator uses 
pooled cross-country and time series data to exploit the additional information provided by the 
variation over time in financial development and its determinants. In this case, we estimate the 
following dynamic panel model 
 
( ) t j j t t j t j t j t j t j t j GC CD GC CD FD FD , 1 , 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 0 , ε η δ β β β α β + + + + × + + + + = − − − − − γX  (16) 
  30The variables used for this estimation are the same as those in the cross-section estimations, and 
t δ  is a time-specific effect;  j η  is a country-specific time-invariant effect; and  t j, ε  is the 
idiosyncratic error term.
51 All the variables are transformed into five-year averages to eliminate 
business cycle fluctuations. Our final sample is a unbalanced panel with   countries and





Equation (16) includes a lagged term to take into account the persistence of the financial 
development variable over time. This determines a “dynamic” panel set-up which imposes some 
estimation challenges of its own. In particular, simple panel OLS estimation of (16) would render 
biased estimates because  j η  is in the error term t j, ε . A simple fixed-effects (within-groups) 
transformation of (16) which eliminates  j η  is also biased for panels with a small number of 
temporal observations because, given the dynamic nature of the model, the new transformed 
(differenced) variables are correlated to the error term (see Bond, 2002).  In order to address this 
problem, we apply the System GMM estimator developed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator allows us to explicitly control for potential biases 
arising from country specific effects in dynamic panel settings.
53 In principle, this method can 
also be used to address another problem that may be prevalent in our sample: the potential 
reverse causality between the dependant variable and some of the explanatory variables. The 
standard approach within this framework is to use internal lagged instruments, which is valid 
under the assumption that the explanatory variables are “weakly exogenous.” This means that 
even though they may be correlated with past or current error terms (and thus they are not 
“strictly exogenous”), they are uncorrelated with future error terms.  
However, the use of internal lagged instruments has been shown to generate problems of 
instrument proliferation which can easily lead to incorrect inference (see Roodman, 2009). In our 
sample, instrument proliferation seems to be a problem as we consistently get implausibly high 
P-values for the Hansen Test of over-identification restrictions, even when we limit the number 
                                                 
j
51 Note that with the inclusion of η , the legal origin dummies are removed from the set of control variables as they are 
subsumed by the time-invariant effect. 
52 The number of countries increases considerably with respect to the cross-section case because, in the latter, we lose 
many countries when we average the data over non-overlapping periods. However, in the panel regressions, most of 
those countries re-enter the sample.   
53 All our models were estimated using the one-step System GMM estimator.  
  31of instruments to the minimum. For this reason, we deal with the potential endogeneity problem 
differently by lagging the explanatory variables one period (five years) and treating them as 
strictly exogenous in the model. Thus, by restricting the number of internal lagged instruments 
included in the regressions to only those of the lagged dependent variable, we can dampen the 
problems associated with instrument proliferation. We test the over-identifying restrictions of the 
model, and the results are supportive of our approach. 
The estimation results for the baseline specification are reported in Table 5. In all cases, 
the coefficient estimates have the expected signs. However, our dynamic panel estimates shows 
systematically lower t statistics for the sets of variables which include interactions possibly due 
to the high correlation between these variables, which difficult the estimation of parameters. In 
fact, in virtually all cases correlation coefficients between level variables (  and ) and the 
interaction terms are about 0.8 (Table A2). 
j CD j GC
The left panel of Figure 9 shows the estimated marginal effect on the dependant variable 
( ) of a decrease in the opposition to financial development (i.e., an increase in ), 
while the right panel shows the marginal effect of an increase in government  capabilities             
( ), based on the first column of Table 5. The results are similar to the case of the cross-
section model: the marginal effects are positive and significant only at high levels of GC  and
, respectively. This, in turn, is supportive of the main hypothesis of the paper: that it is the 
combination of low opposition to financial development and high government capabilities that 
explains why some countries end up with higher levels of financial development. 
t j FD ,
1 , − t j GC
1 , − t j CD
1 , − t j CD
1 , − t j
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  335.  Conclusion 
 
Politics matters for financial development. Otherwise, if countries were managed by benevolent 
social planners, they would have all moved towards full financial development. Greater access to 
credit has important implications for the development of an economy, as it allows firms to enter 
markets and grow, and the resources move to the most productive activities. However, while 
financial development increases overall welfare in the long run, it also affects the distribution of 
rents in the short run. Incumbents may see their profit margins shrink, countries may face a 
higher probability of a negative shock, and governments may lose some of their sources of 
revenues. The combination of interest groups that try to safeguard their rents and governments 
that vie for political survival may prove lethal for financial development. 
This paper proves that point. Countries in which interest groups have more at stake in terms 
of potential rent losses and governments that have fewer capacities to manage the economy are 
more likely to have lower financial development.  However, these are not independent events. 
We find that high interest group opposition to financial development and low government 
capabilities determine lower levels of financial development. 
The framework and the results in this paper are a step forward in the literature because they 
show that the heterogeneity of the incumbents (as measured by Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is 
relevant to explain their attitudes towards financial development (in a political economy model a 
la Rajan and Zingales, 2003), but their influence is not independent of the underlying governance 
structure.  
The policy implications of these results are also novel regarding the previous literature. The 
legal origins view prescribed changes to the legal codes and the political institutions view 
prescribed far reaching institutional reforms designed to limit the authority of public officials 
(Haber, North, and Weingast, 2008). The results in this study indicate that it is not enough to 
tinker with certain very specific rules, and a broader approach may be warranted.  
First, reforms should affect the long-term incentives of political actors to invest in their 
capabilities. How to reach this goal may be a matter of discussion for a whole volume. 
Preliminary evidence seems to indicate that politicians would be more eager to invest in the 
capabilities of government when the conditions are helpful for intertemporal cooperation—
basically, when the basic institutional structure of a country provides actors with long-term 
horizons, open and transparent policy arenas, and enforcement mechanisms (Spiller and 
  34Tommasi. 2007). On the contrary, institutions such as electoral systems that reward short-term 
political gains will not be conducive to long-term investments (Scartascini, 2008; Scartascini and 
Tommasi, 2009; Saiegh, 2010.) 
Second, it may be also necessary to affect the incentives and the power structure of interest 
groups. Two alternatives may work. On the one hand, governments and international 
organizations may find it useful to help in the organization of those groups that would benefit 
from greater financial development. That is, governments and international organizations should 
be very proactive in reducing the collective action costs for firms in sectors that are highly credit 
dependent. Moreover, by helping in the set up of encompassing associations, they may achieve 
this objective while also moving these associations into a self-sustaining path of endogenous 
investments in their capabilities as described in the work by Ben Ross Schneider.
54 
On the other, following the work pioneered by Hausmann and Rodrik,
55 it may make sense 
for countries to make strategic bets on those economic areas that would provide greater industrial 
complexity while weakening the opposition for financial development. This way, an important 
development constraint may be lifted.  
                                                 
54 See, for example, Schneider (2010). 
55 See, for example, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003, 2006) and Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007). 
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  41Table 1. Estimation Results 
 
Dependent variable: Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP, Average 1980 ‐ 2003)
Variables (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4)
Credit dependence ‐0.531 ‐1.554 ‐1.68 ‐1.121

















Real GDP per capita, PPP 6.121 7.983 7.365 6.166
In logs, average 1975‐1979 (2.06)** (2.52)** (2.55)** (1.98)*
Trade openness ‐0.0364 ‐0.0139 ‐0.0531 ‐0.0269
% of GDP, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐0.16) (‐0.06) (‐0.23) (‐0.12)
Financial Openness ‐0.114 ‐0.152 ‐0.18 ‐0.152
% of GDP, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐1.11) (‐1.35) (‐1.67)* (‐1.46)
Trade openness x Financial Openness 0.00196 0.00226 0.00231 0.00213
(2.21)** (2.37)** (2.63)** (2.53)**
French Origin ‐4.90 ‐7.79 ‐5.33 ‐5.79
Dummy variable (‐0.75) (‐1.10) (‐0.77) (‐0.85)
German Origin 33.20 31.50 41.56 36.51
Dummy variable (1.56) (1.72)* (2.00)* (1.69)*
Scandinavian Origin ‐22.26 ‐20.82 ‐24.86 ‐26.01
Dummy variable (‐2.13)** (‐1.78)* (‐2.25)** (‐2.29)**
Constant ‐11.02 ‐2.344 9.58 2.327
(‐0.45) (‐0.06) (0.32) (0.09)
Observations 74 74 74 74





  42Table 2. Estimation Results: Additional Financial Development Measures 
 
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)
Credit dependence ‐1.4 ‐1.457 ‐0.0123 ‐0.436









Real GDP per capita, PPP ‐3.211 ‐4.257 5.502 5.246
In logs, average 1975‐1979 (‐0.82) (‐0.98) (2.02)** (1.89)*
Trade openness ‐0.265 ‐0.322 ‐0.159 ‐0.16
% of GDP, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐0.91) (‐1.19) (‐0.78) (‐0.80)
Financial Openness ‐0.11 ‐0.12 ‐0.381 ‐0.393
% of GDP, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐0.62) (‐0.69) (‐3.30)*** (‐3.44)***
Trade openness x Financial Openness 0.00467 0.00493 0.00506 0.00512
(3.66)*** (4.17)*** (6.05)*** (6.22)***
French Origin ‐7.18 ‐8.98 ‐1.65 ‐1.36
Dummy variable (‐1.11) (‐1.34) (‐0.28) (‐0.23)
German Origin ‐25.04 ‐19.34 40.13 41.43
Dummy variable (‐1.82)* (‐1.09) ‐1.35 ‐1.41
Scandinavian Origin ‐22.4 ‐26.46 ‐21.93 ‐23.35
Dummy variable (‐1.41) (‐1.58) (‐2.64)** (‐2.62)**
Constant 67.51 76.19 6.983 18.49
(2.13)** (2.36)** (0.28) (0.71)
Observations 61 61 70 70






  43Table 3. Estimation Results: Alternative Measures to Incumbents’ Opposition 
 
 
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4)
Strength of Promoters ‐0.648 ‐0.81 ‐1.34 ‐1.092









Real GDP per capita, PPP 9.832 9.449 ‐1.45 ‐3.202
In logs, average 1975‐1979 (2.75)*** (2.45)** (‐0.31) (‐0.60)
Trade openness ‐0.0951 ‐0.0892 ‐0.493 ‐0.45
% of GDP, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐0.37) (‐0.34) (‐1.63) (‐1.56)
Financial Openness ‐0.154 ‐0.171 ‐0.119 ‐0.117
% of GDP, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐1.14) (‐1.27) (‐0.58) (‐0.61)
Trade openness x Financial Openness 0.00249 0.00259 0.00549 0.00536
(2.55)** (2.69)*** (4.37)*** (4.51)***
French Origin ‐3.43 ‐7.02 ‐1.77 ‐6.79
Dummy variable (‐0.44) (‐0.87) (‐0.24) (‐0.98)
German Origin 35.76 37.05 ‐22.37 ‐20.24
Dummy variable ‐1.35 ‐1.34 (‐1.26) (‐0.91)
Scandinavian Origin ‐22.1 ‐26.53 ‐20.2 ‐27.33
Dummy variable (‐1.77)* (‐1.95)* (‐1.35) (‐1.57)
Constant ‐55.5 ‐53.69 18.79 30.15
(‐2.40)** (‐2.29)** (0.57) (0.86)
Observations 66 66 56 56





  44Table 4. Estimation Results: Dealing with Potential Endogeneity 
 
Dependent variable: Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP, Average 1980 ‐ 2003)
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6)
Credit dependence ‐0.632 ‐1.409 ‐1.012 ‐1.907 ‐2.732 ‐2.811
% of capital expenditures, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐0.82) (‐1.48) (‐1.10) (‐1.83)* (‐1.04) (‐1.03)   
Bureaucratic Quality Index ‐14.5 ‐16.13 ‐47.62                
0 ‐ 6, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐1.96)* (‐1.76)* (‐2.08)**                
Credit dependence x Bureaucratic Quality 0.905 0.94 1.844                
(3.16)*** (2.80)*** (2.01)**                
Index of the Quality of Institutions (POL2) ‐5.304 ‐6.68 ‐11.65
0 ‐ 18, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐2.12)** (‐2.47)** (‐1.97)** 
Credit dependence x POL2 0.299 0.338 0.466
(3.39)*** (3.62)*** (1.93)*  
Real GDP per capita, PPP 5.954 5.736 6.639 5.937 19.47 19.66
In logs, average 1975‐1979 (1.82)* (1.77)* (2.01)** (1.85)* (4.07)*** (4.13)***
Trade openness ‐0.0174 ‐0.0369 ‐0.0864 ‐0.0866 0.0318 0.0571
% of GDP, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐0.07) (‐0.16) (‐0.32) (‐0.35) (0.10) (0.20)
Financial Openness ‐0.128 ‐0.144 ‐0.132 ‐0.161 0.049 0.0244
% of GDP, Average 1975 ‐ 1979 (‐1.19) (‐1.33) (‐1.21) (‐1.45) (0.33) (0.15)
Trade openness x Financial Openness 0.002 0.00213 0.0023 0.00243 ‐0.000889 ‐0.000737
(2.29)** (2.50)** (2.40)** (2.65)** (‐0.39) (‐0.32)   
French Origin ‐4.18 ‐5.51 ‐5.92 ‐6.99 0.61 ‐1.71
Dummy variable (‐0.65) (‐0.84) (‐0.86) (‐1.02) (0.09) (‐0.27)   
German Origin 27.15 32.02 29.16 32.70 51.79 56.08
Dummy variable (1.14) (1.32) (1.26) (1.42) (4.01)*** (3.58)***
Scandinavian Origin ‐24.32 ‐27.45 ‐22.83 ‐27.19 ‐24.4 ‐27.93
Dummy variable (‐2.30)** (‐2.47)** (‐2.13)** (‐2.41)** (‐2.21)** (‐2.45)** 
Constant ‐5.769 15.47 1.099 30.47 ‐65.14 ‐67.58
(‐0.25) (0.63) (0.04) (0.96) (‐0.75) (‐0.78)   
Observations 70 70 71 71 27 27
R‐squared 0.68 0.682 0.658 0.67 0.815 0.811
Hansen's overidentification test (p‐value) 0.54 0.296










Variables (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4)
Credit dependence ‐0.24 ‐0.525 ‐0.246 ‐0.155

















Credit to private sector 0.782 0.814 0.795 0.787
% of GDP, first lag (8.89)*** (9.50)*** (9.04)*** (8.86)***
Real GDP per capita, PPP 4.16 3.995 4.227 4.301
In logs, first lag (3.19)*** (3.01)*** (3.42)*** (3.41)***
Trade openness 0.0602 0.0574 0.0543 0.0598
% of GDP, first lag (1.10) (1.02) (0.98) (1.09)
Financial Openness ‐0.0342 ‐0.0254 ‐0.0325 ‐0.0299
% of GDP, first lag (‐0.73) (‐0.54) (‐0.72) (‐0.65)
Trade openness x Financial Openness 0.000196 0.000125 0.000192 0.000166
First lag (0.58) (0.36) (0.57) (0.49)
Constant ‐19.98 ‐17.72 ‐19.52 ‐22.86
(‐1.76)* (‐1.46) (‐1.91)* (‐2.16)**
Number of observations 416 416 416 416
Number of countries 94 94 94 94
Number of i n s t r u m e n t s 2 72 72 72
AR (1) test (p‐value) 0.0269 0.032 0.0282 0.0282
AR (2) test (p‐value) 0.115 0.109 0.132 0.118
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Table A1: Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics: Cross section Analysis
Variable Units Sample period Source Obs Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Financial Development Indicators


































71 ‐1.95 8.08 ‐18.17 28.00
Government policymaking capabilities variables
Bureaucratic Quality Index 0‐6A v e r a g e  1975‐1979 ICRG dataset 74 2.10 1.37 0.00 4.38
Government Stability 0‐12 Average 1975‐1979 ICRG dataset 74 6.72 2.05 2.81 10.58
Corruption 0‐6A v e r a g e  1975‐1979 ICRG dataset 74 3.30 1.65 0.00 6.00
Index of the Quality of Institutions 
(POL2)
0‐18 Average 1975‐1979 ICRG dataset 74 8.54 4.46 1.10 16.00
Additional control variables
Real GDP per capita, PPP (log) % of GDP Average 1975‐1979 Penn World Tables (v 6.3) 74 8.73 1.03 6.71 11.16









74 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Legal origin: French Dummy variable GDN dataset 74 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Legal origin: German Dummy variable GDN dataset 74 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00




(countries) Overall Between  Within
Financial Development Indicators





416 (94) 24.23 9.01 8.52 3.07 4.64 45.69
Government policymaking capabilities variables
Bureaucratic Quality Index 0‐6 416 (94) 2.29 1.24 1.20 0.38 0.00 5.26
Government Stability 0‐12 416 (94) 6.86 1.85 1.52 1.22 2.52 11.00
Corruption 0‐6 416 (94) 3.47 1.50 1.36 0.49 0.00 6.00
Index of the Quality of Institutions 
(POL2)
0‐18 416 (94) 9.29 4.07 3.81 1.24 1.00 16.00
Additional control variables
Real GDP per capita, PPP (log) % of GDP 416 (94) 8.81 0.99 1.02 0.18 6.45 11.39
Trade openness % of GDP 416 (94) 62.39 28.41 30.14 9.32 11.27 192.80
Financial openness % of GDP 416 (94) 106.48 72.14 61.47 45.51 20.12 464.60
Maximum
Std. Deviation
Variable Units Mean Minimum
  47Table A2. Pairwise Correlations 
 
Variables CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 CS8 CS9 CS10
CS1 Credit dependence 1.000
CS2 Bureaucratic Quality Index 0.650 *** 1.000
CS3 Government Stability 0.617 *** 0.817 *** 1.000
CS4 Corruption 0.662 *** 0.831 *** 0.729 *** 1.000
CS5 Index of the Quality of Institutions (POL2) 0.708 *** 0.938 *** 0.826 *** 0.942 *** 1.000
CS6 Credit dependence x Bureaucratic Quality 0.826 *** 0.935 *** 0.818 *** 0.864 *** 0.940 *** 1.000
CS7 Credit dependence x Government Stability 0.901 *** 0.805 *** 0.874 *** 0.783 *** 0.857 *** 0.934 *** 1.000
CS8 Credit dependence x Corruption 0.863 *** 0.825 *** 0.749 *** 0.931 *** 0.922 *** 0.946 *** 0.919 *** 1.000
CS9 Credit dependence x POL2 0.862 *** 0.872 *** 0.801 *** 0.897 *** 0.947 *** 0.977 *** 0.949 *** 0.982 *** 1.000
CS10 Real GDP per capita, PPP (in logs) 0.389 *** 0.546 *** 0.527 *** 0.599 *** 0.608 *** 0.571 *** 0.534 *** 0.574 *** 0.584 *** 1.000
CS11 Trade openness ‐0.102 0.084 0.056 0.125 0.072 0.023 ‐0.043 0.044 0.013 0.252 **
CS12 Financial Openness 0.101 0.141 0.076 0.184 0.163 0.157 0.109 0.189 0.167 0.257 **
CS13 Trade openness x Financial Openness 0.088 0.147 0.094 0.169 0.149 0.152 0.100 0.169 0.150 0.241 **
CS14 Domestic credit to private sector 0.598 *** 0.645 *** 0.563 *** 0.599 *** 0.647 *** 0.727 *** 0.677 *** 0.691 *** 0.710 *** 0.537 ***
CS15 Stock Market Capitalization 0.511 *** 0.587 *** 0.430 *** 0.582 *** 0.585 *** 0.647 *** 0.541 *** 0.629 *** 0.628 *** 0.392 ***
CS16 Liquid Liabilities 0.454 *** 0.414 *** 0.419 *** 0.390 *** 0.425 *** 0.504 *** 0.508 *** 0.479 *** 0.499 *** 0.418 ***
CS17 Credit dependence (labor shares) 0.895 *** 0.6716 *** 0.6201 *** 0.663 *** 0.7264 *** 0.8468 *** 0.8963 *** 0.8665 *** 0.8784 *** 0.511 ***
CS18 Credit dependence (wages shares) 0.935 *** 0.6462 *** 0.5917 *** 0.6228 *** 0.6808 *** 0.8287 *** 0.8839 *** 0.8329 *** 0.8507 *** 0.4074 ***
CS19 Strength of promoters 0.345 *** 0.3405 *** 0.3349 *** 0.3722 *** 0.3371 *** 0.8003 *** 0.9599 *** 0.9205 *** 0.8962 *** 0.5007 ***
Variables CS11 CS12 CS13 CS14 CS15 CS16 CS17 CS18 CS19
CS11 Trade openness 1.000
CS12 Financial Openness 0.754 *** 1.000
CS13 Trade openness x Financial Openness 0.830 *** 0.916 *** 1.000
CS14 Domestic credit to private sector 0.187 0.303 *** 0.335 *** 1.000
CS15 Stock Market Capitalization 0.394 *** 0.585 *** 0.622 *** 0.761 *** 1.000
CS16 Liquid Liabilities 0.316 *** 0.413 *** 0.516 *** 0.848 *** 0.690 *** 1.000
CS17 Credit dependence (labor shares) ‐0.0968 0.1446 0.1121 0.6637 *** 0.5707 *** 0.4965 *** 1
CS18 Credit dependence (wages shares) ‐0.1812 0.0489 0.0248 0.6007 *** 0.4867 *** 0.417 *** 0.9507 *** 1
CS19 Strength of promoters 0.0799 0.0793 0.1253 0.3978 *** 0.3547 *** 0.3663 *** 0.2906 ** 0.3182 *** 1
Variables DP1 DP2 DP3 DP4 DP5 DP6 DP7 DP8 DP9 DP10
DP1 Credit dependence 1
DP2 Bureaucratic Quality Index 0.593 *** 1
DP3 Government Stability 0.417 *** 0.6255 *** 1
DP4 Corruption 0.6082 *** 0.8016 *** 0.5469 *** 1
DP5 Index of the Quality of Institutions (POL2) 0.6433 *** 0.9203 *** 0.663 *** 0.9274 *** 1
DP6 Credit dependence x Bureaucratic Quality 0.8507 *** 0.8973 *** 0.5833 *** 0.8073 *** 0.8873 *** 1
DP7 Credit dependence x Government Stability 0.8878 *** 0.7101 *** 0.7601 *** 0.6855 *** 0.7643 *** 0.8841 *** 1
DP8 Credit dependence x Corruption 0.8657 *** 0.7807 *** 0.527 *** 0.9002 *** 0.8773 *** 0.9372 *** 0.8648 *** 1
DP9 Credit dependence x POL2 0.8775 *** 0.831 *** 0.5854 *** 0.8517 *** 0.9066 *** 0.9737 *** 0.9043 *** 0.9758 *** 1
DP10 Real GDP per capita, PPP (in logs) 0.5366 *** 0.624 *** 0.4351 *** 0.6309 *** 0.6788 *** 0.6591 *** 0.5866 *** 0.6571 *** 0.6767 *** 1
DP11 Trade openness ‐0.0021 0.1384 *** 0.1624 *** 0.1086 ** 0.1337 *** 0.072 0.0724 0.0674 0.0735 0.2143 ***
DP12 Financial Openness 0.1206 ** 0.1684 *** 0.0947 * 0.169 *** 0.2055 *** 0.1878 *** 0.1306 *** 0.1743 *** 0.1965 *** 0.2446 ***
DP13 Trade openness x Financial Openness 0.0746 0.136 *** 0.1069 ** 0.1105 ** 0.1518 *** 0.1252 ** 0.1043 ** 0.109 ** 0.1311 *** 0.2389 ***
DP14 Domestic credit to private sector 0.5128 *** 0.5521 *** 0.3655 *** 0.5059 *** 0.5628 *** 0.617 *** 0.5342 *** 0.5806 *** 0.6085 *** 0.5902 ***
DP11 DP12 DP13 DP14
DP11 Trade openness 1
DP12 Financial Openness 0.565 *** 1
DP13 Trade openness x Financial Openness 0.7839 *** 0.88 *** 1

























1 ALB Albania lower‐middle‐income × 50 KOR Korea, Rep. upper‐middle‐income × ×
2A R E U n i t e d  Arab Emirates high‐income, non‐OECD × × 51 KWT Kuwait high‐income, non‐OECD × ×
3 ARG Argentina upper‐middle‐income × 52 LBY Libya upper‐middle‐income × ×
4 AUS Australia high‐income, OECD × × 53 LKA Sri Lanka lower‐middle‐income × ×
5A U T A u s t r i a h i g h ‐income, OECD × × 54 LVA Latvia lower‐middle‐income ×
6 BEL Belgium high‐income, OECD × × 55 MAR Morocco lower‐middle‐income × ×
7 BGD Bangladesh low‐income × × 56 MDG Madagascar low‐income × ×
8 BGR Bulgaria lower‐middle‐income × 57 MEX Mexico upper‐middle‐income × ×
9B O L B o l i v i a l o w e r ‐middle‐income × × 58 MLT Malta high‐income, non‐OECD ×
10 BRA Brazil upper‐middle‐income × 59 MWI Malawi low‐income × ×
11 BWA Botswana upper‐middle‐income × 60 MYS Malaysia upper‐middle‐income × ×
12 CAN Canada high‐income, OECD × × 61 NAM Namibia lower‐middle‐income ×
13 CHL Chile upper‐middle‐income × × 62 NER Niger low‐income ×
14 CHN China low‐income × 63 NGA Nigeria low‐income × ×
15 CIV Cote d'Ivoire low‐income × × 64 NIC Nicaragua low‐income × ×
16 CMR Cameroon low‐income × × 65 NLD Netherlands high‐income, OECD × ×
17 COG Congo, Rep. low‐income × 66 NOR Norway high‐income, OECD × ×
18 COL Colombia lower‐middle‐income × × 67 NZL New Zealand high‐income, OECD × ×
19 CRI Costa Rica lower‐middle‐income × × 68 OMN Oman upper‐middle‐income ×
20 CYP Cyprus high‐income, non‐OECD × × 69 PAK Pakistan low‐income × ×
21 DNK Denmark high‐income, OECD × × 70 PAN Panama upper‐middle‐income ×
22 DOM Dominican Republic lower‐middle‐income × × 71 PER Peru lower‐middle‐income ×
23 DZA Algeria lower‐middle‐income × × 72 PHL Philippines lower‐middle‐income × ×
24 ECU Ecuador lower‐middle‐income × × 73 PNG Papua New Guinea lower‐middle‐income × ×
25 EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. lower‐middle‐income × × 74 POL Poland upper‐middle‐income ×
26 ESP Spain high‐income, OECD × × 75 PRT Portugal high‐income, OECD × ×
27 ETH Ethiopia low‐income × 76 PRY Paraguay lower‐middle‐income × ×
28 FIN Finland high‐income, OECD × × 77 ROM Romania lower‐middle‐income ×
29 FRA France high‐income, OECD × × 78 RUS Russian Federation lower‐middle‐income ×
30 GAB Gabon upper‐middle‐income × × 79 SDN Sudan low‐income × ×
31 GBR United Kingdom high‐income, OECD × × 80 SEN Senegal low‐income × ×
32 GHA Ghana low‐income × × 81 SLV El Salvador lower‐middle‐income × ×
33 GRC Greece high‐income, OECD × × 82 SVN Slovenia high‐income, non‐OECD ×
34 GTM Guatemala lower‐middle‐income × × 83 SWE Sweden high‐income, OECD × ×
35 HKG Hong Kong, China high‐income, non‐OECD × 84 SYR Syrian Arab Republic lower‐middle‐income × ×
36 HND Honduras low‐income × × 85 TGO Togo low‐income × ×
37 HTI Haiti low‐income × 86 THA Thailand lower‐middle‐income × ×
38 HUN Hungary upper‐middle‐income × 87 TTO Trinidad and Tobago upper‐middle‐income × ×
39 IDN Indonesia low‐income × × 88 TUN Tunisia lower‐middle‐income × ×
40 IND India low‐income × 89 TUR Turkey upper‐middle‐income × ×
41 IRL Ireland high‐income, OECD × × 90 TZA Tanzania low‐income ×
42 IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. lower‐middle‐income × × 91 UGA Uganda low‐income ×
43 ISL Iceland high‐income, OECD × × 92 URY Uruguay upper‐middle‐income × ×
44 ISR Israel high‐income, non‐OECD × × 93 USA United States high‐income, OECD × ×
45 ITA Italy high‐income, OECD × × 94 VEN Venezuela upper‐middle‐income × ×
46 JAM Jamaica lower‐middle‐income × × 95 ZAF South Africa lower‐middle‐income × ×
47 JOR Jordan lower‐middle‐income × × 96 ZMB Zambia low‐income × ×
48 JPN Japan high‐income, OECD × 97 ZWE Zimbabwe low‐income × ×
49 KEN Kenya low‐income × ×
  49Table A4. Manufacturing Industries and External Financial Dependence 
ISIC code Industry name Rajan & Zingales
314 Tobacco ‐45.0
361 Pottery, china, earthenware ‐15.0
323 Leather products ‐14.0
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic ‐8.0
372 Non‐ferrous metals 1.0
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 3.0
353 Petroleum refineries 4.0
369 Other non‐metallic mineral products 6.0
313 Beverages 8.0
371 Iron and steel 9.0
311 Food products 14.0
321 Textiles 15.5
341 Paper and products 16.5
342 Printing and publishing 20.0
351 Industrial chemicals 20.5
355 Rubber products 23.0
332 Furniture, except metal 24.0
381 Fabricated metal products 24.0
331 Wood products, except furniture 28.0
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 33.0
384 Transport equipment 38.7
390 Other manufactured products 47.0
362 Glass and products 53.0
382 Machinery, except electrical 75.5
352 Other chemicals 85.5
383 Machinery, electric 90.5
385 Professional & scientific equipment 96.0
356 Plastic products 114.0
Source: Rajan and Zingales (1998)  
 
  50